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Tim mawson’s latest contribution to philosophy is a valiant effort to 
provide an introductory textbook that is accessible to those unfamiliar 
with academic philosophy. The book shows promise in places, but there 
are some issues that hinder it achieving its goals. Firstly, a major area in 
the contemporary free will debate does not receive as adequate a hearing 
as would be expected in a book of this sort. The unfortunate consequence 
skews the imagine of the current debate by making the position that 
mawson is defending appear to be on much stronger footing than it 
actually seems to be. Secondly, there are many editorial decisions that 
do not give the feel or appearance of an introductory textbook. Finally, 
there is one prominent issue with the overall argument of the book.
before discussing these issues, it will be useful to provide an overview 
of mawson’s position. mawson defends a type of source incompatibilism 
that is very similar to robert Kane’s (1996) account, except that mawson 
replaces the event-causal element present in Kane’s account with a type 
of agent-causation. Source incompatibilism is the view that a person 
is morally responsible for an action or decision as long as they are the 
ultimate author (or source) of that action or decision. mawson, like 
Kane, argues that to be the ultimate author of one’s actions, these actions 
must have their source in a ‘self-forming’ action. A self-forming action 
requires alternative possibilities. mawson differs from Kane in that he 
requires agent-causation for self-forming actions, whilst Kane requires 
event-causation that is cashed out in terms of quantum indeterminacies 
occurring in the brain. Kane’s view is often plagued by objections relating 
to the problem of luck or arbitrariness, because it does not seem to be up 
to the agent, in a relevant sense, what the outcome of their decision is, 
despite the fact they have some alternative possibility.
mawson starts his defence by exploring every day intuitions and 
assumptions about free will and moral responsibility. This part of the 
book is impressive in its use of appropriate examples and engaging 
prose. The five intuitions that mawson uses to underpin his defence of 
source incompatibilism are: 1) ‘Sometimes I could do something other 
than what I actually do’; (2) ‘Sometimes I’m morally responsible for what 
I do’; (3) If I couldn’t do other than what I actually do, then I wouldn’t be 
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morally responsible for what I do’; (4) ‘If I wasn’t the ultimate author of my 
actions, then I wouldn’t be morally responsible for them’; and (5) ‘To the 
extent that I did not will an action under the morally salient description, 
I am not fully morally responsible for it.’ (52) Intuitions (3) and (4) 
are the most important. (3) corresponds to the principle of alternative 
possibilities, and (4) corresponds to the source incompatibilist view that 
an agent must have significant influence of their actions and decisions.
A problem arises in mawson’s discussion of the principle of alternative 
possibilities. There has been much discussion ever since Harry Frankfurt’s 
(1969) groundbreaking paper in which he provides an apparent counter-
example to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). PAP is the 
notion that when persons are held morally responsible it is because they 
‘could have done otherwise’ and when they are not it is because they 
could not have done otherwise. PAP covers many of the intuitions that 
mawson uses to underpin his account, and a particular difficulty stems 
from Frankfurt-style cases. It is worrisome that much of the debate 
regarding Frankfurt cases has been omitted. of course, in a book of this 
type it is not expected that every aspect of a debate is going to be covered. 
However, the way mawson structures his argument relies on the strength 
and plausibility of this intuition, so it is problematic when an issue which 
directly relates to this is not given the full hearing it deserves. Frankfurt 
cases are set up in such a way that an agent no longer has alternative 
possibilities yet intuitively is still morally responsible. mawson’s reply is 
that the agent would still have some alternative, i.e. they could still have 
done otherwise, because it must be that the agent will show some sign 
of doing otherwise in order to allow the intervener to force the agent 
to do as they will. mawson counters John Fischer’s (1994) claim that 
such a ‘flicker of freedom’ would not be robust enough an alternative 
possibility to ground moral responsibility by saying that even this 
alternative is enough to change the outcome from one of responsibility to 
non-responsibility for the agent in the example. mawson, however, does 
not consider Fischer’s other point that it is what happens in the actual 
sequence of events that relates to moral responsibility. In the alternative 
scenario the agent would have lacked moral responsibility, but in the 
actual scenario they would still have moral responsibility whilst lacking 
robust alternative possibilities. even in a textbook style book such as 
this there should really be a greater discussion of what is one of the two 
liveliest debates in contemporary free will literature (the other being the 
debate over manipulation arguments against compatibilism).
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PAP leads to another issue with mawson’s overall argument. As 
mentioned earlier, much of his defence of source incompatibilism relies 
on its intuitive plausibility. Source incompatibilists are not required to 
defend PAP because they admit that agents can be morally responsible 
for actions that are determined to a certain extent, as long as those 
actions have an indeterministic source. mawson describes the situation 
as holding the person morally responsible for the earlier action, i.e. the 
self-forming action, rather the actions that result from the self-forming 
action. Although this might be true in some cases, such as mawson’s 
case of the drunk student (we hold the student responsible for getting 
drunk rather than the acts committed whilst drunk), it is not clear that 
this is how the social practice of moral responsibility works. It seems that 
normally when a person is held morally responsible, it is for the actions 
in question, rather than the formation of their character. Some might 
even argue that persons have little to no control over the formation of 
their characters. even so, describing the situation as holding the person 
morally responsible for the actions that stem from the self-forming action 
seems like an equally good explanation of what is occurring in this sort of 
explanation. The worry that arises with this part of the argument is that 
PAP says that an agent is morally responsible if they ‘could have done 
otherwise’. mawson, following Kane (1996), sees PAP being entailed 
in the ultimate authorship, i.e. ultimate authorship requires alternative 
possibilities at moments in a person’s life that will contribute towards 
shaping their character in order to be ‘self-forming’ actions. The worry 
arises in what appears to be sort of ‘sleight of hand’ as support for PAP is 
transferred onto the source incompatibilist view: a morally responsible 
agent must be the ultimate author of his or her actions. Although both 
positions are similar, they are not the same. ultimate authorship requires 
that agents ‘could have done otherwise at key moments in life’, whilst 
PAP only requires that agents ‘could have done otherwise’. A closer look 
at PAP is likely to reveal that the strength of PAP relies on the idea that 
a morally responsible agent ‘could have done other for every action and 
decision’. There is no room to defend this view here, but it is worth noting 
that many other source incompatibilists do not require PAP for their 
views. For example, Derk Pereboom (2001) actually argues in favour 
of Frankfurt-style counter-examples against PAP. Although it is matter 
for further investigation whether or not intuitive support for ultimate 
authorship is equal to that of PAP, at the very least this issue needs to be 
confronted.
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much of the rest of the book covers standard ground in defence of 
source incompatibilism. As ‘self-forming’ actions play an important role 
in his account, mawson spends a lot of time defending their coherence, 
whilst modifying Kane’s concept by substituting the event-causal process 
that Kane is an advocate of with a form of agent-causation. on mawson’s 
view, agent-causation can provide the required alternative possibilities 
that make self-forming actions self-forming. mawson strays from the 
standard defence of source incompatibilism when he invokes ‘souls’ as 
a way of explaining how agent-causation might be possible. This is an 
interesting way to handle the difficult the issue of agent-causation, if 
empirically questionable. Souls would provide a way of explaining this, 
but many would also complain that this sounds like simply explaining 
one mystery with another mystery.
The other issues are weighted towards what appear to be editorial 
decisions. one initial problem is the length of the chapters. many of 
those unfamiliar with academic philosophy, and even many who are 
familiar with it, are going to be anxious at the length of each chapter. 
This worry is offset initially as there many subsections dividing the 
separate issues discussed under the topic of each chapter. unfortunately, 
these subsections are neither numbered nor named. This creates great 
difficult when navigating through the text, especially when an issue has 
been raised in a specific chapter and the reader wishes to return to the 
section in which it was discussed. This is likely to provide difficult for 
those who are inexperienced in reading philosophy and who have not 
been conditioned into writing notes whilst they read.
A final worry regards further reading. It has become commonplace in 
textbooks of this sort to include sections which detail the works of others 
that the reader is free to explore if they are interested in a particular 
debate or argument. Sadly, this book lacks clearly set out sections that 
discuss further reading. mawson does helpfully provide some examples 
of further reading, but these are in the endnotes, and many who are 
new to reading academic texts may not bother checking the endnotes. 
Providing a brief discussion on further reading allows the reader to avoid 
what can initially seem a daunting task of finding other areas of literature 
that discuss what they are interested in. books and articles mentioned 
in further reading also have the benefit of being recommended by the 
author of the book they are currently reading.
mawson does well to provide an introductory text that is accessible 
to those unfamiliar with academic philosophy. mawson’s array of 
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examples is novel and is described in such a way that it avoids the 
difficulty that might occur to those unfamiliar with many of the strange 
thought experiments that philosophers employ. However, the lack 
of further discussion on the issue of Frankfurt-style counter-examples is 
worrisome. This could have been countered to some degree by providing 
a section that detailed further reading, particularly one which pointed 
out the philosophers in favour of both positions. It is unfortunate that 
much of the intuitive support that mawson gathered stemmed from 
PAP, because this required a much fuller discussion of Frankfurt-style 
counter-examples. These issues could have been avoided, but sadly were 
not, and this results in the book failing to achieve its full potential.
